The hard fact that ‘pro-Europeans’ have to grasp is that for many people the EU is not at all that great. Quite the contrary, the EU imposes tough economic rules, yet gives little palpable in return.

The argument that Euroskepticism could be overcome by better ‘framing’, PR techniques or a ‘new narrative’ appeals to many ‘pro-Europeans’. Its logic is simple: the EU does good things, but they are complex by nature and thus difficult to understand. Therefore, the solution surely lies in simplifying the language, engaging the skeptics on Twitter and carrying the day. Sadly, this belief reflects the pro-European elite’s failure to grasp the deeper reality of what shapes people’s perceptions and what the EU today does.

In fact, the EU’s problem is not the absence of a catchy narrative, but the presence of a rather unpopular substance. The lack of a positive narrative is only the most visible sign of the EU’s growing institutional and ideological tensions and this is what the pro-Europeans should really be worrying about, rather than decrying the lack of spin.

…

(The article was published on openDemocracy on April 24, 2014 and is available in full here)

Marko Bucik is board member of WES and works as a consultant for the World Bank, in Washington, DC. He is also a regular contributor to the Slovenian daily Večer, writing on the European Union, US politics and global affairs.

Syria’s ongoing existential conflict is arguably related to its nation-building trajectory starting in the beginning of the twentieth century. What can theories of nation-building and state formation tell us about the origins of conflict as well as future of the Syrian state? In The Politics of Nation-Building,[1] I identify the conditions under which the ruling political elites of a state target ethnic groups with assimilationist policies instead of granting them minority rights or excluding them from the state. I develop a theory that focuses on geostrategic considerations arguing that a state’s nation-building policies toward non-core groups — any aggregation of individuals perceived as an unassimilated ethnic group by the ruling elite of a state — are influenced by both its foreign policy goals and its relations with the external patrons of these groups. I posit that external involvement, whether clandestine, covert, or overt, drives not only the mobilization and politicization of the non-core group’ s identity, but also the host state’ s perception of the non-core group and the state’ s nation-building policies toward the group.

Through a detailed study of the interwar Balkans, I conclude that the way a nation-state treats a non-core group within its own borders is determined largely by whether the state’s foreign policy is revisionist or cleaves to the international status quo, and whether it is allied or in rivalry with that group’s external patrons. However, as I admit in the book, my argument does not travel to all states at all times. In particular, it should apply to countries that 1) are driven from a homogenizing imperative, 2) have non-assimilated segments of the population and no caste system in place, 3) have the capacity to directly rule the population, and 4) have a ruling political elite representing a core group with a clear “national type”. In what follows, I explore how my work illuminates some of the challenges of nation-building in the Syrian case.

Arguably, the Syrian government has not been motivated by a homogenizing imperative. This begs the question, why some places in the world are run by core groups consisting of apparent minimum winning coalitions,[2]while others by elites that go at great lengths to establish national states. [3] Why do some countries have leaders that try to make the national and the political unit overlap and others that opt to rule with a minimum winning coalition? One argument suggests that the degree of diversity prevents the nation-building path in some cases. Other arguments focus on the pattern of spread of nationalist ideology and/or the prevalence of competing ideologies such as communism, or colonial legacies. Yet others put forth the importance of war-making and imitation of successful military tactics as a mechanism that accounts for the spread of nationalism and the nation-state system.[4]

In The Politics of Nation-Building I build on some of these explanations and suggest that the main reason that leaders adopt the “nation-building option” is the reality, or anticipation, of other powers manipulating non-core groups in their state to undermine their stability or annex parts of their territory. This process is particularly conspicuous in situations where the ruling elites perceive their borders to be challenged. While this process worked in Tilly’s account of Europe [5] and fits the pattern I narrate in the interwar Balkans, it does not seem to fit so much the story in Syria. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and after a brief interlude of direct rule by Ibrahim in the mid-19^th century, the territories of contemporary Syria were divided up by decree through a series of treaties. Syria was under the French Mandate since 1920 and after a tumultuous history gained independence in 1946. As it is often the case, colonial powers had to rely on local elites coming from specific groups for political and economic control. Syria was no exception and the role of the Alawis and Christian minorities was vital for the French from the beginning of their Mandate. As Wendt and Barnett put it,

“Lacking political legitimacy, the colonial state’s power was always underwritten by the actual or threatened use of force. Significant military resources were typically not available from the centre, however, and since mass mobilization was not viable for an army of occupation, colonial states tended to militarize coopted groups or ethnic minorities. A similar process occurred in colonial bureaucracies, which were staffed by persons with a vested interest in upholding the authority of an alien state. The character of colonial military and bureaucratic development, in other words, was shaped by the security needs of foreign actors and their domestic clients rather than of the mass population.”[6]

As a result of this legacy, as well as the geopolitical situation in the region, this system of choosing a loyal local ethnic group and ruling the rest of the population through it–that has its roots to the French colonial period–was perpetuated. The various military coups following independence until Hafez al-Assad consolidated his rule on the country in 1970 solidified this outcome. The legitimating principle of the Assad regime has not been state-level nationalism. In fact, repression and a carefully constructed network of informants were the basis for legitimacy in Syria for the past four decades—if not longer. To complement this apparatus Lisa Wedeen revealed a cult that the Assad regime—father and son—designed which operated as a disciplinary device. [7] For decades citizens acted as if they revered their leader. “The cult works to enforce obedience, induce complicity, isolate Syrians from one another, and set guidelines for public speech and behavior” as Wedeen put it in 1999.[8]

Another set of conditions for my argument to be applicable is that part of the population has not yet been successfully assimilated and there is no “caste structure” in place since in caste systems assimilation is by definition impossible.[9] Syria is definitely a heterogenous society, but the heterogeneity is more pronounced depending on which cleavage dimension is salient at each historical moment. In terms of ethnicity, about 90% of the population was Arab before the civil war—including about 500,000 Palestinians and up to 1.3 million Iraqi refugees—while there were about 9% Kurds and smaller groups of Armenians, Circassians, and Turkomans. In terms of religion, based on 2005 estimates 74% of the population were Sunni Muslims, Alawis were about 12%, Druze 3%, while there are also some small numbers of other Muslim sects, Christians 10%, about 200 Jews, and Yazidis.[10] Finally, in terms of mother tongue we find the vast majority speaking Arabic, and then Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, and Circassian being used by the respective non-core groups. Moreover, although this was not a caste system the mode of rule was definitely blocking social mobility and especially political clout for non-Alawis and their close allies and informants. The rule of the Alawi controlled Baath party coupled with the state of emergency that had been in force since 1963 had decisively alienated the Arab Sunni majority. But following the Arab Spring and coupled with past violence, inequalities, and repression that many reportedly felt in Syria, resistance against the regime grew and by now it has turned into a multiparty civil war. The opposition is fragmented but defections from the Assad side have also been plentiful. The lack of any national cohesion is apparent.

Nation-building cannot be pursued by a failed state that cannot directly rule its population. Assad’s regime clearly did not suffer from this problem. Syria was far from a failed state. In fact, it is a state with high literacy rates– 88% for males and 74%for females. But even if Syrian ruling elites faced the pressures I described above and had the capacity to do so, they would have had a hard time to nation-build. For nation-building to occur, the ruling political elites of the state must represent a core group that is well defined and has a clear criterion of inclusion—a “ national type” in what Eric Hobsbawm called the age of nationalism. In Syria, the closest thing we can find to a constitutive story in Assad’s Syria has to do with a Pan-Arab identity. Particularly, a version of baathist ideology that combines a supranational form of nationalism that calls for the unity of Arabs with anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism and secular socialism.[11] Arab nationalism, a form of unification nationalism,[12] was vital in the struggle for independence—a by-product of British machinations against the Ottoman Empire—as well as the decolonization movement against the French. Thus, the state-level type of nationalism that dominated Europe, did not manage to emerge in much of the Arab Middle East, since such a unification was opposed by multiple great and regional powers. The short experiment of the United Arab Republic that brought Egypt and Syria together in a union between 1958 and 1961 was stillborn but characteristic of the supranational character of the constitutive story that motivated Syrian leadership.  Given this configuration, it is really hard to identify a Syrian constitutive story and this is reflected in the school curriculum that primarily emphasizes anti-Zionist ideas, Pan-Arab ideas, and ironically, Sunni Islam.[13] Thus, while linguistically and ethnically there could be an overwhelming majority constructed–that of Arabs and Arabic–if one had to decide what constitutes the core group in Assad’s Syria, they would most likely suggest that it is the Alawis – together with other minorities – in the exclusion of the Sunni Arab majority.

Despite the well-known arguments that territory is becoming increasingly less important in our globalized world, myriad of territorial disputes, dozens of border changes and the long list of “nations without a state,” or “stateless nations,” point to a more sobering picture. For the past couple of years, several external state and non-state actors are aligning themselves with internal factions or non-core groups in Syria. However, the most powerful regional states Turkey, Iran, and Israel – all non-Arab– are unable to dominate Syria through these local alliances. The USA can be an arbiter of the conflict by intervening with Sunni, which would please Turkey and the Gulf states along with Sunni populations in Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt—each for different reasons.  Alternatively, if Iran prevails, Alawis in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia minorities in the Gulf States, and the Shia majority of Iraq would rejoice. But a more cynical point of view, one perhaps best summarized by Ed Luttwak,[14] suggests that the USA—and even Israel —should allow this war to go on since it is in their strategic benefit for the factions to fight each other thus preventing the emergence of a strong and unified Arab state, or a victorious Iran.  A note of caution flows from my work in the Balkans. Shifting alliances in the context of the current multiparty civil war with ample external backing, coupled with the rapid changes in control over territory already have lead and will continue to lead to repeated instances of violent exclusionary policies, since non-core groups that are perceived as enemy-backed, or collaborating with the enemy, are going to be targeted by the respective sides of the conflict.

This article first appeared in: The Political Science of Syria’s War, POMEPS Briefing #22, December 18, 2013. 

In the past, U.S. and European negotiators have tried and failed to create a unified transatlantic market. But the trade talks that President Obama announced this month have a much better chance of succeeding, thanks to a greater need for economic growth on both sides, the threat of China’s illiberal economic behavior, and the desire to give U.S.-European relations a new purpose.

TYSON BARKER is the director of transatlantic relations at the Bertelsmann Foundation.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139027/tyson-barker/for-transatlantic-trade-this-time-is-different

September Is the Cruelest Month

Welcome back from summer holiday, Europeans! Get ready for 30 days that will determine the fate of your continent.

By Tyson Barker

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/30/september_is_the_cruelest_month?page=0,1

When German travelers return from their hallowed August vacations this week, they will find that the euro is gone — at least as far as Frankfurt airport is concerned. Without much fanfare, the massive euro sculpture, a fixture at Germany’s largest airport since 2001, was unceremoniously dispatched in the dead of night to make room for an inter-terminal railway. The sculpture’s unloved twin, which is famously perched in front of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the heart of Frankfurt, has become the symbol of the eurozone crisis (and a favorite of wire service photographers) and may suffer a similar fate. When the bank moves to the east end of the city in 2014, some urban planners are lustily planning the sculpture’s removal from public view. Symbols are inexorably tethered to politics, and this one is a doozy.

First, on Sept. 12, Germany’s constitutional court is set to rule on the constitutionality of participating in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), an institution that was envisioned as the permanent facility for pooled sovereign lending to debt-strapped European countries. The ESM, which passed the Bundestag comfortably (493 votes to 106) in June, would have autonomous control over German public funds — and therein lies the legal problem. The German constitutional court sees itself as the guardian of a certain idea of Germany — small, stability-minded, and inwardly oriented — and court watchers expect a “yes, but…” ruling that stipulates that the red lines of German democracy have been reached. Any further moves to integrate crisis management at the eurozone level — and there will inevitably be more — will necessitate a referendum, the first in Germany’s post-war history. Already the debate around a possible constitution-altering plebiscite is driving the political narrative.

The second crisis point is the upcoming assessment of Greece’s progress in fulfilling the terms of its loan conditions by the troika of the ECB, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), expected in late September or early October. Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras is already trundling between Berlin and Paris in an attempt to prepare eurozone leaders for a disappointing report. Athens’ hope for extending its repayment schedule has sparked heated debate in Germany, where exasperated rhetoric on the political right about the inability of Greece to meet its commitments has become more vociferous. Grandstanding in the Bundestag in the wake of the troika report is likely, especially from the arch-conservative Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) and the business-minded Free Democratic Party (FDP). Germany’s paper of record, Der Spiegel,called in May for Greek’s exit from the euro, citing its unwillingness to undertake structural and labor-market reforms.

For ultra-cautious German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the unintended, potentially devastating second and third order consequences of the “Grexit” are anathema. She is a politician who prizes the maintenance of the status quo above all else and fears the unpredictable effects on Spain, Italy, and France, among other countries. A Grexit would eliminate all credibility that the eurozone has left as an insoluble currency union. This could lead to massive speculation and capital flight on an unprecedented scale from countries seen as next in line to go. While German banks have limited but important exposure to Greek debt, they have much more exposure to other countries of the eurozone’s south and a need for these markets as consumers for German exports. The effects would tear through the German economy. It is this worry, not a vague sense of European solidarity, that drives the chancellor to hold firm on Greek membership in the eurozone amid the siren calls from her backbench to kick Greece out.

Which brings us to the third element in the eurozone crisis saga — the Dutch elections, also scheduled for Sept. 12. The Netherlands is one of the small economic powerhouses that has aligned itself with Germany — tough-minded but traditionally somewhat pro-European. This summer, prominent Dutch politician Bas Eickhout excoriated a group of American commentators for focusing on Germany when lamenting the eurozone’s future, when they should focus more on the Dutch and the Finns. His criticism is justified — both countries are seen as losing their resolve to contribute to the financial lifelines for more bailouts beyond current commitments and the Dutch elections are expected to serve as a release valve for voters’ frustration with regarding the eurozone crisis management.

The Netherlands and Finland have not enjoyed the same economic boomlet that Germany had experienced until recently. The Dutch economy shrunk by almost 1.5 percent in the first half of 2012, and Moody’s added a negative outlook to the country’s prized AAA rating due to the weakening economy. This economic stagnation has bolstered the country’s political fringe: The far-left Socialist Party (SP), which is currently leading in the polls, says it would flout EU budgetary rules, call for a referendum on the recently signed EU Fiscal Pact, oppose rescue packages for Greece, and roll back the “Berlin Consensus” economic policy built on hard money, tight fiscal controls, and structural reform. Euroskeptic Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) will also play a pivotal role in the election’s outcome: The famously anti-Muslim politician was in an informal alliance with the center-right until recently and brought down the countries’ last government over opposition to EU imposed austerity requirements. His party is also expected to get a substantialshare of the national vote.

The Netherlands’ atomized politics reflects a wider ungovernability sweeping Europe. Here, as in Finland, the Euroskeptic fringe is squeezing out the pro-European center. The Dutch elections could add a new actor to the already unwieldy pantheon of potential spoiler governments.

Amidst all this chaos, the fourth and final crisis may be sparked by attempts to draw EU countries closer together. On September 11, the European Commission is expected to present a blueprint a for banking union — a logical extension of EU’s single market. Such a union should create depositor guarantees across the eurozone, guarantee muscular pre-emptive supervision across borders, and establish re-capitalization and wind-down plans for troubled banks that ensure consistency in case of a systemically important bank failure. It would also sever the link between banking and sovereign debt woes. In short, such a scheme is intended to free Europeans from a vicious cycle in which a collapse of a major national bank in a country such as Spain will inevitability lead to the total collapse of Spain’s public finances.

These would be necessary and straightforward reforms in a political vacuum. But the EU is anything but a politics-free zone. A banking union will work only if European member states are willing to cover depositors in neighboring states and provide European institutions with tools, such as taxation, that allow reserves to be accumulated in order to shore up weak banks. Since negotiations on such a union will be awash in parochial politics, Euro-watchers should expect decisions that will limit ability of the EU to override national authorities in countries such as Spain and France. Talks are also probable on a limited role for any fiscal pooling that could create a eurozone-wide deposit insurance designed to mitigate the risk of exit from the currency union.

These are just the latest sagas in the ongoing eurozone crisis. In the absence of strong institutions, clearly defined decision-making processes, and a pan-European political culture, the EU has created a snowballing political and economic crisis. The odd reality is that the world economy is now held hostage by such minor political dramas as votes in the Slovak parliament, bilateral collateral negotiations between Finland and Greece, and the ominous statements by former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. This is the height of indulgence, and a reflection of a saturated political environment that is drowning Europe. All of this is having a corrosive effects on European society — which, if policymakers aren’t careful, may turn out to be the euro’s ultimate legacy.

Tyson Barker is the director of the transatlantic relations program at the Bertelsmann Foundation.

Romney’s Trans-Atlantic Policy Needs a Reboot

A Commentary By Annette Heuser and Tyson Barker

Likely Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney will visit the United Kingdom and Poland at a time when the GOP’s policy toward Europe seems to be trapped in the days of the Cold War. It will be a chance for him to update his outdated views.